Guns and Butter

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The "guns and butter" problem is one of economics' oldest examples: a government with finite resources must choose how much to allocate to military spending ("guns") versus civilian consumption ("butter"). Lyndon Johnson's refusal to make this choice during the Vietnam War era — trying to fund both an escalating military campaign and an ambitious domestic programme simultaneously without raising taxes — produced a classic case study in the inflationary consequences of fiscal self-deception.
Johnson's Dilemma

By 1965, Lyndon Johnson faced a genuine political and economic dilemma. The Vietnam War, which he had inherited from Kennedy and escalated dramatically, was consuming increasing resources. Simultaneously, his Great Society programme — Medicare, Medicaid, the Civil Rights Act's economic provisions, the War on Poverty — represented the most ambitious domestic spending expansion since the New Deal.
Johnson's economic advisers, including Council of Economic Advisers chairman Gardner Ackley, warned him explicitly in December 1965 that simultaneously funding Vietnam and the Great Society without a tax increase would produce inflation. The economy was already at full employment; additional government demand would push against supply constraints and drive up prices.
Johnson was advised to choose: raise taxes (politically unpopular, especially while a war was being sold as limited and temporary), cut the Great Society (ideologically unacceptable), or cut military spending (operationally impossible without changing the war strategy). He chose a fourth option: do nothing, and hope the economy could absorb the pressure.
The Inflationary Consequences

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The consequences arrived with the predictability Johnson's advisers had forecast. From 1965 to 1970, the US consumer price index rose by approximately 25% — moderate inflation by later standards but a genuine shock to a post-war economy accustomed to price stability. The Fed, under William McChesney Martin, initially accommodated the fiscal expansion rather than offsetting it with tighter monetary policy.
The inflation eroded the real wages of workers, reduced the real value of savings, and began the dollar overvaluation that would eventually make the Bretton Woods gold-dollar peg unsustainable. Johnson's decision not to choose ultimately made the choice for him — and for the next several administrations that inherited the inflationary consequences.